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We argue that the International Accounting 
Standard Board‟s difficulty in arriving at a 
standard for accounting for emission rights, 
which is central to Emission Trading 
Schemes, is an opportunity to re-examine the 
issues from an environmental ethics 
approach. We critically evaluate the IASB 
approach which privileges profits, and views 
emission rights as tradeable entitlements to 
pollute. We consider social ecology, an 
example of an environmental ethical 
perspective which holds that humans‟ 
survival and the environment‟s sustainability 
are inextricably linked.  We conclude that 
social ecology can inform accounting 
standard setters about the accounting 
treatment of emissions rights.   
1.    INTRODUCTION  
Climate change presents challenges for all 
stakeholders - individuals, policy makers, 
industries, and the eco-system (IPCC 2008). 
In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was released as 
an international response to climate change, 
whereby industrialised countries agreed to 
reduce Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions 
“by 8% between 2008 and 2012, in relation 
to 1990 levels” (Blass, 2006, p. 30). The 
challenges and responses to climate change 
also provide an opportunity to engage in 
ethical approaches to the environment, not 
only by immediate stakeholders but by 
accounting standard setters. 
The dominant response of industrialised 
countries to abate GHG has been to apply 
market mechanisms (Lohmann 2009, 
MacKenzie 2009).  Emissions Trading 
Schemes (ETS) provide a market mechanism 
whereby a central authority transforms GHG, 
of which „carbon‟ is one, into a new tradable 
commodity (Andrew, 2008).  It is assumed 
that the value of carbon pollution can be 
arrived at by trading emission rights that is, 
trading in the “right to emit pollutants” 
(IASB 2008a, para5).   
Solomon and Lee (2000, p. 35) described 
ETS as a market means of “internalizing 
externalities”. Traditionally the cost of 
pollution is considered an externality and 
thus is excluded from production costs.  By 
giving carbon pollution a „price tag‟, it is 
assumed that entities would be given an 
economic incentive to reduce carbon 
pollution in order to avoid the additional 
financial burden of having to purchase 
emission rights to cover actual emissions.  
In order that ETS succeed in reducing overall 
emissions, there needs to be a limited supply 
of emission rights, and as a scarce resource 
the market is meant to determine the most 
efficient price of emission rights (Andrew, 
2008). Price would influence whether it is 
more efficient for a firm to adopt carbon 
friendly technology rather than keeping the 
same polluting technology and buy emission 
rights.  Blass (2006) argued that by allowing 
participants of an ETS to buy or sell emission 
rights it would mean that the Kyoto target 
could be achieved by the most cost efficient 
means.  For entities that are unable to meet 
the emissions reduction target, they would 
have to purchase additional emission rights 
from „cleaner‟ entities, and/or a central 
authority and/or a „greener‟ country in order 
to cover their actual emissions level. While a 
central authority sets the maximum allowable 
carbon emissions quantity, the market 
mechanism is used to trade in permits and 
therefore will drive the price of emissions 
rights (Blass, 2006, Andrew, 2008).  
Despite the fact that ETS have been in 
operation for about 4 years, according to the 




around “£15billion in 2007” worldwide 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008, p.18). 
Companies participating in ETS need to 
reflect this impact in their financial reports. 
Accordingly, the international accounting 
profession, through its standard setting 
guidelines, is required to engage with this 
new mechanism for carbon abatement. While 
it is the notion of a „carbon pollution cap‟ 
that is expected to set the goal of emissions 
reduction, it is the cost of emission rights that 
is expected to change business behaviour in 
order to deliver emissions reduction 
(Andrew, 2008). The need to internalise costs 
of pollution or trade in emission permits, has 
the effect of  shifting what was traditionally 
an external and costless concept into a costly 
activity and, hence, is “at the heart of the 
challenge to standard setters” (Cook, 2009, p. 
457). The environmental crusader Gore 
(2007) urged: 
a re-examination of accounting 
systems and measurement protocols to 
include the environment in the routine, 
everyday calculations by which our 
economy is governed.  
This paper re-examines accounting for 
emissions rights in a way that is appropriate 
to address our ecological crisis.  
In this paper we will first demonstrate that 
efforts to recognise emission rights, so far, 
have been dominated by mainstream 
accounting approaches. We critically 
evaluate the proposed mainstream accounting 
approach in order to open further discussion 
about accounting for emission rights. We 
highlight the implication of accounting for 
emission rights from an environmental ethics 
perspective. In particular we consider social 
ecology as an example of an environmental 
ethics approach and use this to re-examine 
the „nature‟ of emission rights. We conclude 
that a social ecology view, an approach of 
environment ethics, offers insights into why 
accounting for emissions rights as assets or 




2.    BACKGROUND 
Global ETS participants continue to await 
comprehensive and clear guidance from the 
International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB). The IASB‟s efforts to develop. 
comprehensive guidance on accounting for 
emission rights have already been extremely 
challenging. The IASB‟s International 
Financial Reporting Interpretations 
Committee (IFRIC) issued IFRIC 3 Emission 
Rights as “an appropriate interpretation of 
existing IFRSs for accounting for the EU 
Scheme” (IASB 2005). Despite the 
subsequent withdrawal of IFRIC 3, the IASB 
continues to have accounting for ETS on its 
board agenda (IASB, 2007; IASB 2008a; 
IASB 2008b). According to IFRIC 3 and 
consistent with the IASB Framework, 
emission rights are recognised as assets.  The 
question remains: can this recognition 
adequately capture the „nature‟ of emissions 
rights and still be consistent with the Kyoto 
protocol? 
IFRIC 3 was withdrawn because it “creates 
unsatisfactory measurement and reporting 
mismatches” (IASB 2005). Therefore, 
companies were also concerned that the 
application of IFRIC 3 would force them to 
show a “distorted picture of their 
performance” (Cook, 2009, p. 457).  This 
delay in implementing comprehensive and 
clear guidelines on accounting for emission 
rights from the IASB provides an opportunity 
to reconsider the basis upon which earlier 
attempts to arrive at an accounting standard 
rest. This paper focuses on the recognition 
issue rather than the measurement issue in 
relation to emission rights. The IASB (2008) 
has identified that, apart from the 
measurement issue, there are other 
fundamental issues that need to be 
appropriately addressed first. For example, 
what is the nature of an emission right? Is an 
emission right an asset? How should an 
emission right be recognised initially, 
particularly if a reporting entity receives it 
from a government as a grant or free of 
charge? Should a liability be recognised? 
Without resolving the nature of emission 




be able to decide what attributes of an 
emission right they are trying to represent 
and ultimately to measure. In the next 
section, the notion of environmental ethics 
will be introduced to help shed light on how 
the „nature‟ or „essence‟ of emission rights 
can be re-examined.  
 
3. MAINSTREAM APPROACHES, 
ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS AND 
SOCIAL ECOLOGY 
3.1    Mainstream Approaches 
The importance of understanding emissions 
rights in the context of the environment is not 
merely a technical issue of recognition or 
measurement. There are fundamental issues 
at stake which are reflected in the questions 
Hopwood (2009, p. 435) raises, namely: 
…can the ethical considerations of 
environmentalists be transferred to the 
economic market place? Or will the 
values of the market place overwhelm 
those of the environmental sphere, 
introducing a totally new set of 
unanticipated consequences and 
actions which are likely to be to the 
longer term detriment of the original 
concerns? 
If emissions rights are seen as private 
property, then they possess the fundamental 
characteristics of assets with economic 
benefits, controllability and tradability. 
However, is the essential nature of emission 
rights adequately reflected if they are 
recognised as assets? The challenge to the 
IASB is not surprising considering that the 
IASB views the issue of emission rights as a 
technical one. The body has proposed a 
traditional, mainstream approach to provide 
answers. Mainstream approaches have 
considered ethical issues as non-technical 
and hence these have remained outside the 
IASB‟s domain. The IASB‟s approach is 
most evident when accounting standard 
setters see emission rights as something 
merely upon which the right „price tag‟ must 
be assigned. It is at this point that we can 
pause to reconsider another way to 
conceptualise emission permits and to 
consider them as inextricably linked to the 
ecological crisis. 
In bringing to the forefront the imperative to 
mitigate climate change we are then able to 
identify that there is a serious moral 
dilemma, rather than a mere technical 
challenge. Zimmerman (1994, p. 3) argued 
that:  
…ecological problems cannot be 
solved by simply tinkering with the 
attitudes and practices that generated 
those problems.  
Environmental ethics offers another context 
within which to consider accounting for 
emission rights.  
3.2 Environmental Ethics 
Environmental ethics “examines how human 
beings should interact with the non-human 
world around them” (Palmer, 1997, p. 6). As 
a theoretical framework, environmental 
ethics “develops, suggests and analyses ways 
out of an environmental crisis” (Andrew, 
2000, p. 197). In this paper we argue that 
social ecology, an approach of environmental 
ethics (Andrew, 2000) can be applicable to 
the re-conceptualisation of emission rights. 
As defined by Light (1998), social ecology 
posits that there is a relationship between 
society and the eco-system which can be 
investigated.  Inspired by Marx‟s work on 
social hierarchy and class domination in a 
capitalist society, proponents of social 
ecology recognise the continuities between 
the natural world and human society, and 
their possible synthesis (Bookchin, 1980, 
Callicott and Frodeman, 2009). The 
ontological foundation of social ecology 
recognises that the exploitation of nature not 
only destroys the intrinsic value of eco-
systems, but also the life line essential for 
human survival (Light 1998). Social 
ecologists see actions addressing  ecology as 
social (Light, 1998; Bookchin, 1989). 
Accordingly, humans are deemed to have an 
obligation to preserve nature as it is also a 
part of the preservation and survival of 
human-kind (Bookchin, 1980; 1989; 1990). 




the environment was also stressed by Geno 
(1995, p. 176):   
…if human societies are to come to 
grips with their relationship to, and 
interdependence on, natural capital in 
the form of indispensable resources for 
survival, institutions such as 
accounting and economics must face 
the moral as well as technical 
challenges in accounting for 
sustainability.  
Social ecology is consistent with the view 
that human potentialities can shape the 
future, and need to be brought to the 
forefront of humans‟ action (Bookchin, 
1980). 
3.3 Social Ecology 
Social ecology challenges the mainstream 
notion of „rationality‟ by describing current 
society as “…a totally irrational society that 
threatens to undermine the fundaments of life 
on this planet” (Bookchin, 1980, p. 28). It is 
suggested that since it is logically possible 
for humans to achieve self-realisation 
without averting serious environmental 
damage, it is a matter of developing an 
attitude that appreciates the intrinsic value of 
nature (Holbrook, 1997, Bookchin et al, 
1990). Consequently our ecological problems 
can only be solved with a shift in mindset 
(Holbrook, 1997, Bookchin et al, 1990). Such 
an attitude can assist us in making „sensible‟ 
social action which has economic sense and 
ecological sense in the long term.  
In reference to the notion of „land ethics‟ 
Leopold, an environmental ethics pioneer, 
suggested that the boundaries of community 
need to include nature (Nash, 1990). He 
proposed that in a sustainable society humans 
and nature co-exist in a non-hierarchical 
manner, and the idea of life community 
extends far beyond traditional definitions 
(Leopold 1933, cited in Nash, 1990). 
Leopold approved the notion of responsible 
“alteration, management and use” of natural 
resources, and pointed out that humans have 
the responsibility to take action to “prevent 
the deterioration of the environment” (1933 
cited in Nash, 1990, p. 71). Birkin (1996) 
argued that accounting for ecology should 
take into account environmental externalities 
to ensure that economic growth does not go 
beyond the carrying capacity of an eco-
system.  Social ecology adopts an open and 
inclusive approach and can enable the 
integration of the environment into the 
“social realm and not divorced” from it   
(Gallhofer and Haslam, 1997, p. 163). 
Consistent with social ecology, Eckersley 
(1998, p.169) pointed out that individuals 
make choices by  
…developing new technologies, 
cultivating new social relations, 
creating new legal relations, critically 
re-examining human consumption 
patterns, needs, desires, and re-
evaluating and enlarging what passes 
for human virtues.  
Social ecology also includes “power, 
authority and democracy” (Light, 1998, p.86) 
and thus accommodates the complexities that 
inform and shape the social aspect of an 
ecological perspective. In this way, social 
and the ecological insights are given equal 
prominence and can inform each other. 
Social ecologists reject the notion of 
„antihumanism‟ and „biocentrism‟, which put 
humanity against ecology. Instead, Bookchin 
argued that nearly “all ecological problems 
are social problems” (1989, p24) and that 
radically separating social evolution from 
natural evolution can only further alienate 
humanity from the natural world “in which it 
has always been rooted as a complex and 
thinking life-form” (Bookchin, 1989, p. 23). 
Social ecology is an approach to 
environmental ethics that “does not seek to 
destabilise anthropocentrism” (Andrew, 
2000, p. 207). Social ecologists do not 
challenge the notion of environmental 
management; rather, it is the intention of 
environmental management that social 
ecologists seek to challenge. Environmental 
management is seen by social ecologists as a 
way to “exercise the powerful and privileged 
status humans enjoy in the natural 
community” (Schweitzer, 1935, cited in 




A summary of the differences between 
mainstream approaches and social ecology 
approaches to the environment is provided in 
Table 1. Briefly, social ecology explores the 
role humans can play in achieving long-term 
sustainability, where sustainability includes 
social, ecological and economic aspects.  In 
other words, social ecologists challenge the 
existing mainstream dominant ideology of 
short-term, economic growth which is 
unsustainable and which has been achieved at 
the cost of nature (Geno, 1995; Andrew, 
2000). As seen in Table 1, the 
anthropocentric view implicit in mainstream 
approaches is suspended by social ecology in 
favour of a non-hierarchical relationship 
between humans and the ecology. Therefore, 
social ecology considers human survival as 
 
Table 1: Comparison of Mainstream and 
Social Ecology approaches to the 










































being inextricably linked to nature‟s survival. 
This view challenges mainstream thinking 
about nature as being an externality. 
Consistent with mainstream views, the role 
of humans is to maximize their personal 
utility (Chua, 1986), and a short-term focus 
of the economy is inevitable (see Table 1). 
According to mainstream approaches, the 
role of accounting in society is integral to the 
requirements of capital markets. By contrast, 
social ecology considers humans to be 
guardians of nature in order to protect the 
needs of future generations. Accordingly, the 
role of accounting is to facilitate and reflect 
this custodial function. The focus of social 
ecology of the economy must therefore be 
long-term.  
 
4. ACCOUNTING FOR EMISSIONS 
RIGHTS AND SOCIAL ECOLOGY 
4.1 Emission rights as assets 
The reliance on market-mechanisms as 
providing an adequate response to GHG and 
their impact on climate change has raised 
implications for environmental accounting 
(Hopwood, 2009; MacKenzie, 2009). 
Accounting does play an important role in 
ecological crisis, however, whether or not 
accounting becomes part of the solution or 
part of the problem (Lohmann, 2009) 
depends on how accounting standard setters 
understand the „nature‟ of emission rights.  
The IASB‟s withdrawal of IFRIC 3 
“illustrates the problems faced by standard 
setters as they explore the frontiers of 
accounting” (Cook, 2009, p. 457).  Based on 
mainstream accounting, standard setters have 
struggled to establish a workable standard. 
The suggested accounting treatment of 
emission rights, as an asset (IASB 2005), 
however, appears to maintain the „business-
as-usual‟ mindset rather than reflect any 
cognisance of the importance of 
environmental ethics.  
In applying the environmental ethics of social 
ecology one can ask a new set of questions 
which were not possible of a mainstream 
paradigm. Consistent with mainstream 
approaches, emission rights are essentially 
pollution rights that an entity can trade to 
allow GHG to be emitted.  The monetary 
benefits that an entity can generate from the 
sale of emission rights lead to the treatment 
of emissions rights as assets. However, a 
„right‟ is problematic in a wider social and 




comparison between mainstream and social 
ecology approaches to emissions rights.  
A mainstream approach would view 
emissions rights as assets to be controlled by 
the entity. The capacity to sell these in an 
ETS ascribes a „future economic benefit‟ to 
the emission rights. Accordingly, the concept 
of having a right to emit carbon pollution is 
incongruous with social ecology. Clark 
(2001, p. 435) pointed out that the idea that 
humans can possess the right to pollute is 
unacceptable and “absurd from an ecological 
point of view”. Schweitzer suggested, the 
powerful and privileged status humans take 
for granted, does not entail “a right to 
exploit” but rather, “a responsibility to 
protect” (1935, cited in Nash, 1990, pp. 61-
62).  
Table 2: Comparison of mainstream 
approach and social ecology approach to 
emissions rights  
Mainstream Social Ecology 
Control: exclusive 
controlled by an 
entity 
Responsibility: humans 














(gained and lost) 
Non-monetary social 
and ecological benefits 





The earlier discussion of social ecology as an 
approach to environmental ethics argued that 
it is human responsibility to reduce GHG 
emissions. If a responsibility to reduce 
emissions is recognised from holding 
emission rights, would it not behove a 
reporting entity to recognise an 
environmental obligation? Hayward (2007) 
criticised ETS for focusing merely on the 
right to emit.  He argued that in the debate 
over climate change, people tend to lose sight 
of the fact that carbon emissions reduction is 
the responsibility of humans. Hayward 
(2007, p. 434) noted that  
…patenting the monetary value of the 
rights may not only take precedence 
over any concern about the 
environment, but may also serve to 
distract policy-makers from pursuing 
viable alternative approaches to 
making the reduction. 
The focus on accounting for emissions rights 
as assets has demonstrated the saliency of the 
profit imperative, rather than an effective 
action to reduce GHG emissions.   
The intention of ETS is to „internalize‟ 
pollution costs and ultimately alter business 
behaviour, that is “management strategy ... 
philosophies and practices” (Buhr, 2007 p. 
67) However, accounting for emission rights 
as assets may not result in entities changing 
their behaviour if it is not „efficient‟ for them 
to do so. Therefore, the quest to reduce GHG 
emissions to mitigate climate change may be 
mere rhetoric to enable corporate profits to 
be generated from ETS. The self-interest-
profit-maximisation imperative upheld by 
mainstream approaches to climate change is 
evident in the following comments about 
ETS by Birley (2008) from the European 
Climate Exchange 
…this scheme is allowing those who 
change early to make money…you put 
technology on top. of your 
smokestacks that will stop. the carbon 
from going into the atmosphere, you 
can profit from it.  
Yet, a firm does not have to be reducing 
GHG emissions to be able to profit from an 
ETS. While emission rights are seen as 
having future economic benefits and 
fulfilling the definition of an asset, polluters 
could purchase emission rights and sell them 
later when the price has been driven up by 
the market. Therefore, recognising emission 
rights as assets could produce outcomes that 
undermine efforts to abate carbon pollution.     
4.2 Emission rights as liabilities 
If emission rights are not assets perhaps they 




reporting entity could recognise a liability to 
fulfil an obligation to purchase rights in order 
to be able to emit. However, this would still 
signal a suspension of any environmental 
ethics in the accounting treatment of 
emission rights. Is it sufficient to recognise a 
financial monetary obligation to be able to 
pollute? Gibson (1996) suggests that it would 
be more effective to control the source of 
emissions, rather than charging for the 
emissions when they are already in the air, an 
“end-of-pipe approach” (Gibson 1996 p. 
659). Unfortunately, recognising a liability 
still upholds the self-maximising mindset of 
mainstream approaches since the monetary 
obligation „entitles‟ the firm to emit 
pollution.   
A social ecology approach to emissions 
rights provides a challenge to the mainstream 
approach to emissions rights accounting (see 
Table 2). Emission rights whether viewed as 
assets or liabilities, fall within the property 
rights held by an entity and hence within 
their exclusive control. A social ecology 
approach suspends notions of control to 
adopt notions of responsibility by humans as 
environmental managers or guardians.  
Rather than emission rights providing future 
economic benefits or sacrifices, which 
emphasises the short-term, a social ecology 
approach emphasises the imperative of a 
long-term view of intergenerational 
sustainability. From a social and ecological 
perspective future benefits are non-monetary. 
A mainstream view relies on a capacity to 
measure reliably the economic benefits of 
emission rights as a result of past 
transactions.  The „nature of emissions rights 
from a social ecology approach, renders 
measurement an inconsequential issue. It is 
the co-existence of humans and the 
environment which is significant.  
5. CONCLUSION 
Efforts explicitly to cost pollution by the 
construction of emission rights have not 
yielded acceptable results even to those 
seeking to benefit from an ETS. While the 
intention of introducing an ETS is naive at 
best, it still relies on self-interest-profit-
maximising mindsets to prevail, and this, we 
argue will be at the expense of the 
environment. Focusing on the accounting for 
emission rights, a construct of ETS, has not 
been resolved by the IASB so far.  We have 
seen this challenge as a reason to pause and 
recognise that emissions rights is an 
unprecedented issue which traditional views 
of accounting are not well equipped to 
address. Further, we argue that the claimed 
objectives of ETS to abate GHG emissions 
cannot be met if anthropocentric views 
persist.  
We have presented a social ecology view, an 
approach of environment ethics, which can 
offer insights into why accounting for 
emissions rights as assets or liabilities would 
undermine efforts to reduce GHG emissions. 
Emissions rights when characterised as either 
assets or liabilities, that is, seen as future 
economic benefits or sacrifices are still 
constructs within the control of entities 
participating in an ETS. Reduction of GHG 
emissions need not be achieved, since the 
incentive of an ETS is to make profits on 
trading. A social ecology approach is based 
on the long-term survival of humans and the 
environment. Seeking monetary benefits is 
viewed as short sighted. We have argued that 
the „nature‟ of emission rights can best be 
understood in the light of social ecology 
which keeps the environment and human 
survival at the forefront.  Social ecology, as 
an environmental ethic, enables us, and 
importantly, accounting standard setters, to 
provide a foundation for re-examining the 
„nature‟ of emission rights.   
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